Who's in charge? After twenty-nine years of Tomorrow's Schools, are decisions really being made by the community?

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Statement of Academic Integrity

I declare that this research report is entirely my own work. When the ideas, quotations, data and diagrams of others have been used in the report, the work has been properly cited in the text.

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Abstract

This paper examines the power balance that exists between principals and the community within schools in New Zealand. The effectiveness of the decision making process within Boards of Trustees is measured against the socio-economic index (decile) that has been assigned to each school by the Ministry of Education using New Zealand Statistics data. A survey was designed to collect the demographic data of trustees and measurements of effective decision making, and compare them to the decile of each respondent and a definition of effective governance. The paper finds that there is a positive link between decile and effective decision making. School boards in more privileged areas experience more effective decision making. The gender, age, and ethnicity of trustees are also linked to socio-economic outcomes in that there are fewer ethnic minorities found on the boards of lower decile schools. The structures that the Education Act 1989 established 29 years ago have created these inequities, particularly for the underprivileged and for small rural schools. It is recommended that the taskforce reviewing of the Education Act takes these inequities into account and creates structures that allow lower socio-economic communities to be empowered and for small communities to thrive.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Background

This paper examines the roles and relationships within New Zealand school Boards of Trustees (BOT). Specifically, the paper explores the dynamic between school principals and elected community representatives in the South Island. Major reform in 1989 created a mode of operation designed to empower communities of parents at the expense of educators.

1984 saw the election of the Fourth Labour Government in New Zealand. The new leadership inherited an economic crisis and implemented neoliberalist policy. The dollar was floated along with deregulation in financial markets. State owned enterprises were corporatised and/or privatised. In the rest of the Anglophone[1] world the Chicago School of economics had influenced the new leaders of the UK, US, Australia, and brought about a Public Management revolution during the 1980s. Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979 on a platform of deregulation and economic reform. In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected and continued the agenda of deregulation. Bob Hawke was elected in Australia in 1983 and continued the work of deregulation.

In 1988, the New Zealand government announced intention to reform the education system and appointed businessman Brian Picot to propose a new structure. The report recommended a series of changes that devolved decision making and responsibility from the state right down to the community attached to each school. A hypothetical consequence of this restructure is that wealthy communities may develop well-qualified boards with effective governance and poorer communities may develop less effective boards. This paper seeks to find out if there is a relationship between effective governance and socio-economic status.

Background – PICOT: Parents In Charge Of Teachers

The framework that was created in 1989 set out to ensure that decision makers were as close to the effects of their decisions as possible (Lange, 1988). The policy meant that parents would elect Boards of Trustees from the community to govern over school finances and act as employers (Picot, Rosemergy, Ramsey, Wise, & Whetumarama, 1988). The main instrument of these reforms was the creation of Boards of Trustees (BOTs). These would be elected groups of parents that would be accountable for the allocation of an operational grant from the Ministry of Education.

The Picot Report, named after one of the authors, was referred to within the teaching profession by an acronym: Parents In Charge Of Teachers (Hills, 2013). Under the new legislation elected members

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[1] The literature refers to "the UK, Australia, New Zealand and many other OECD countries." (Hood, 1991)

of the community would appoint the principal and act as her employer. Along with the help of external expertise they would appraise her performance. The BOT would hold the principal accountable for the management of the school and have the authority to dismiss her if needed.

Decile: Categorising boards, schools, and communities

Since 1995 the ministry has categorised schools by decile according to the socio-economic status of their communities (Donnelly, 2003). This index is derived from the socio economic status of the students that attend. The purpose of the decile system is to target funding towards lower socio-economic groups.

Decile is judged against the following criteria:

- Household income
- Occupation ("labourers, all machine operators and assemblers, and others who work in occupations at these lower skill levels regardless of the sector, type, or profession involved" (Education, 2017)
- Household crowding (a ratio of occupants to bedrooms)
- Educational qualification (secondary or tertiary qualifications)
- Income support

The decile label provides a useful measurement to describe a school board for this paper. A decile rating tells us about the social advantages that a community may enjoy. It is important to note that the decile rating is consistently misunderstood as a quality rating by many members of the public (Donnelly, 2003). High decile schools are located next to expensive real estate, and it's widely believed that the houses are expensive because the schools are good. However, it could be argued that the reverse is true. The decile system is under ministry review and will be replaced with a Risk of Not Achieving Index (Ministry of Education, 2017)

Variables

This paper will measure an independent variable (school decile) against a dependant variable (capacity for decision making). School decile is decided by the Ministry of Education from data compiled by Statistics New Zealand. Capacity for decision making will be measured by surveying BOT members and considering their demographic data and asking them to comment on the nature of their board meetings.

Hypothesis

School decile causes a change in capacity for decision making. It isn't possible that capacity for decision making could cause a change in school decile.

Research Question

This research project seeks to answer the question: **Who's in charge? After twenty-nine years of tomorrow's schools, are decisions really being made by the community?** The possible answers to this question might be the principal, the chair, the staff, the proprietors, or the elected board members.

This study may be useful to:

- Parents – helping them appraise the performance of BOTs
- Boards of trustees – informing principal appraisal
- Principals and school leaders – making them aware of the decision making process
- The Ministry of Education – reporting on current practice
- New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZSTA)

Twenty-nine years later, the systems and behaviours are well established and one thing is clear: the intent of the act, for <u>boards</u> to set budgets and manage policies, has not been widely successful.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

A literature review was conducted across Google Scholar, New Zealand Onscreen, New Zealand Council for Educational Research (NZCER), YouTube, and reference lists. Papers of interest were those that that evaluated education reforms and board effectiveness. Studies were classified into those addressing the reforms and those that look at effective governance, particularly in New Zealand. Pivotal works by Hood (1991) and Bevir (2012) were used as a framework to analyse the literature.

For the purposes of this paper, a definition of effective governance and decision making is established. The definitions of governance from the Ministry of Education, researchers, and the New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZSTA) are compared. Some gaps are identified in the literature which this paper seeks to address.

Governance and Management

> *"… many forms of collaborative governance strongly favour the wealthy, the more educated, and those who belong to dominant racial and ethnic groups."*
> *(Bevir, 2012)*

Hughes (2003) discusses a "politics/administration dichotomy." Politicians and policies come and go, and civil servants enact these policies on behalf of the governance structure. This is what is referred to in the New Zealand literature as governance and management (Langley, 2009; Ministry of Education, 2013). In all the training material for boards of trustees, much is made of the difference between governance and management (Langley, 2009). It is so often mentioned, and so widely, that it might be a mantra for tomorrow's schools. The literature consistently argues that management is the role of the principal (Langley, 2009; Ministry of Education, 2013; C. Wylie, 1997). Management means the day-to-day running of the school. Buying chalk, HR, marketing, administration, assessment, curriculum, finance... Governance is the role of the board. This means writing policies and monitoring the effects of these policies(Ministry of Education, 2010).

The government and NZSTA literature does not address expertise in the roles of governance. Trustees are called upon to represent their communities. It is assumed by The Picot Report that common sense and the endorsement of the wider community are qualification enough. But schools and communities are rewarded for appointing boards with expertise (Gordon, 2015). School managers (principals) aren't trained in marketing, HR, or finance (Watson, 2013). Hughes' politics/administration dichotomy informs a useful model to understand the role of a board member. It is a trustee's role to represent the needs and aspirations of a community (like a political

leader), set policy, and to hold managers to account. Ideally, the only expertise necessary is the ability to understand the high-level nature of policy and the courage to hold managers to account.

Of all the changes that were experienced by individuals along the value chain, none have been more affected than principals. Each were required to transform from an educational leader into a:

> *"…human resource manager, building and infrastructure overseer, chief executive officer, instructional leader, cultural guru, community leader, major arbiter with school boards, fund manager and fund raiser, seeker of 'donations', and marketer to foreign fee-paying students. So much of this work is managerial and entrepreneurial, rather than instructional." (Langley, 2009)*

Hodgen and Wylie's work states that 59 percent of principals describe their relationship with the board as "happy, relaxed, but I do most of the work."(Hodgen, 2005)

A central tenet of democracy is that citizens have the ability to make decisions about the parts of government that affect their lives. Bevir argues that the invention of governance invites citizens to "pay less attention to allegedly fixed institutions and more to shifting processes…" Citizens can empowered by governance. The literature broadly defines two models of governance. Collaborative Governance and Modernist Governance. Collaborative governance is flat and does not ask experts to make decisions. Experts report to the board in a way that is transparent and coherent. The board of governors reach decision through discussion and debate. However, Bevir states:

Modernist Governance practice is marked by the presence of experts. In a business this might be engineers and scientists. Lockhart (2008) argues that a board needs members who are capable of doing their own research, not relying on reports from experts. In a school, these experts might be accountants and lawyers. Again, this favours wealthy communities. The Picot Report assumes Collaborative Governance, but allows for Modernist Governance with the co-opted members ("Education Act," 1989). For the purposes of this study we will define effective governance as **collaborative decision making.**

Due to the degree of devolution the ministry has undergone, it now has very little authority (Langley, 2009). It only intervenes as a matter of last resort, preferring to leave the community (/market) to make its own adjustments. The ministry is not accountable to the community. The BOT is. Boards appoint and can dismiss principals. The ministry can dismiss a board, appoint a commissioner or limited statutory manager at a school.

The community arm of the trio (the teaching profession, the ministry and the BOT) is regarded as the "…smoothest running…."(Langley, 2009). The "volunteers … are doing at least as well as the … officials who came before them."(Robinson, Ward, & Timperley, 2003).

From Public Administration to New Public Management

> *The overall concept of an elected Board of Trustees springs from the commercial model of a Board of Directors with a vested interest in the success of the enterprise. Because Brian Picot, the architect of Administering for Excellence, was a businessman, it should not be surprising that the plan he drew for the administration of schools was a commercial design, rather than a communitarian one. The overall idea of accountability through competition arises from the concept of profit/loss in the market place. (Fisk, 2002)*

Keynesian public policies had been in place across the Anglophone[2] world since the great depression. Keynes advocated a managed market economy: an active role for government intervention by levering fiscal policy and government spending. Economies were regulated in most Anglophone countries because their governments understood that the free market had proven to be imperfect. Public policy, influenced by Weber (Hughes, 2003), was regulated and hierarchical in a true modernist sense. There was "one best way" (Hughes, 2003) to provide public services. Qualified expertise and rigid process were at the heart of the civil service. Civil servants were selfless, loyal to the state, and had jobs for life.

Milton Freidman, the most influential among the Chicago School of Economics, first addressed the public education system arguing for parental choice (Freidman, 1955). He discussed whether the role of government is to administer or finance education. Freidman was clearly concerned with the growth in government influence. Freidman argued that an educated society is beneficial to all, so basic education is regarded as part of citizenship and should be paid for by the state. It's important to note that 'educated' is defined as having "literacy and knowledge". Freidman envisaged market forces driving teacher salary, and parental choice driving an education marketplace.

Hood's pivotal work in 1991 described and analysed the changes that had occurred over the previous 20 years and has foretold many of the changes since (Hood, 1991). Hood identified the period between 1930 and 1980 as Public Administration. He called the change during the 1980s New

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[2] See definition on page 4

Public Management (NPM). In his paper he identified four megatrends, two of which will be identified with the literature.

- "attempts to slow down or reverse government growth…" (RGG)
- "the shift toward privatisation…" (PRI).

The cost, effectiveness, and responsiveness of central government to community concerns brought NPM to the Anglophone world during the 1980s (Asquith, 1997; Hood, 1991; Robinson et al., 2003). In New Zealand, following fundamental changes to the role of government the Fourth Labour Government commissioned a proposal to reform education from early childhood to tertiary. The Picot Report recommended reduction of the authority, reach, and accountability of government so that decisions were made as close as possible to their impact (Picot et al., 1988)(RGG, PRIV). This shift is described in the literature as from hierarchy to markets (Bevir, 2012), and from transactional to business culture (Asquith, 1997).

Hood describes NPM as the merger of post war public choice and the science of managerialism. The economic boom following the WWII created a large middle class, accustomed to choice. Under NPM, the public would be treated as empowered consumers. Parental choice meant that schools (businesses) needed to attract families (consumers) with enhanced programmes and facilities, better results, and higher status. In New Zealand, status is commonly associated with decile (L. Gordon, 1994). The public acted like consumers making choices based on the marketing efforts of each school (L. Gordon, 1994).

Managerialism is the study of management. Under NPM, civil servants were elevated from Weber's model of selfless servants of politicians to accountable managers. In education, this meant that schools acted like businesses and principals acted like managing directors. Managerialism means KPIs and goals, leadership and innovation, entrepreneurial thinking. The influence of Mintzberg (1971), Hersey/Blanchard (1976), and Csíkszentmihályi (2003) made businesses and organisations phenomena to be studied scientifically. Mintzberg analysed the role of the manager by measuring how much time they spent on tasks such as meetings and reporting. Hersey/Blanchard developed the Situational Leadership Model specifically for managers in an education setting. This model has been applied in many other contexts. Csíkszentmihályi's "flow" is an intrinsic reward model. Assigning the right individuals the right tasks can lead to a high level of self-motivation.

The most important change that Tomorrow's Schools brought about was the formation of Boards of Trustees (BOTs)(Lange, 1988; Langley, 2009). Picot (1988) envisaged communities making decisions about their schools. Trustees would be elected members who would represent the values, cultures,

and aspirations of the community by making policy decisions for each school. The model being imposed upon schools was the model of the board of directors (PRIV).

The Journal of Accounting and Organizational Change describes the successful creation of a more efficient school (Tooley, 2007). However, this may have been a superficial change.

> *"… New Zealand schools adopt business accounting technologies as a symbol of 'rational' management, but in so doing may conceal the continuation of traditional administrative structures and procedures whereby measures of control and evaluation … and are developed on a symbolic basis."* (Tooley, 2007)

Principals are not business managers. The majority are teachers that have demonstrated leadership potential and aspiration. Tooley's assertion suggests that school leadership has attempted to adopt the disciplines of managerialism but the administrative process remain unchanged.

The intent of Tomorrow's Schools (Lange, 1988) was to incentivise good management on the part of leadership and good governance on the part of BOTs. Schools were encouraged to "see themselves as directors of successful businesses…" (L. Gordon, 1994). Better educational outcomes and more effective use of resources would be rewarded by an increasing roll brought about by parent choice. This means marketing, sales, and strategy. Gordon describes a perverse pattern, where "rich schools" would appoint successful business owners, as well as lawyers and accountants to their boards. These talented, educated, and privileged members of the community donated their time for free to the very schools that did not need it. The lower decile schools in turn attracted middle management and skilled tradespeople who are less qualified. These schools struggle in an education marketplace.

Changes to school management, and the introduction of an education marketplace in New Zealand were almost perfectly in sync with changes in England and Wales. The purpose of devolution was very similar: to "match their services directly to student need" (Bowe, Ball, & Gold, 1992). As in New Zealand, an education marketplace was created in order to incentivise communities to fix problems and make schooling effective and efficient. However, these two policies, devolution (in order to reduce the power distance) and marketplace education conflict. For example, cherry picking out-of-zone students who will perform well and raise profile of the school is counter to meeting the needs of the community.

In New Zealand, BOTs have the authority to maintain discipline by suspending or standing down (colloquially known as expelling) students. In an education marketplace this authority has two perverse effects. High standards of discipline are used as a marketing message. Parents want their

children to be safe and form good habits of behaviour. However, other local schools are obligated to enrol students that are stood down ("Education Act," 1989). This enables BOTs to filter out undesirables and push students with poor behaviour into competing schools (Wylie, 2007).

The Education Act 1989 has been described as a success (Langley, 2009), and would have been a greater success if more of the entire set of recommendations were executed. Notably, one of Picot's recommendations was for a Community Education Forum which would provide leadership and moderate competition between clusters of schools. We are now seeing this idea re-emerge in the form of Kahui Ako (aka Communities of Learning) (Wylie, 2016). In 2014, the Fifth National Government attempted to incentivise cooperation. Kahui Ako are clusters of 10 or so schools that attract more funding in order to improve the outcomes in their community. Bevir (2012) describes this phase as "networks."

Gaps in the literature

The sample size of much of the research into NZ schools is small (5-15 schools) (Csikszentmihalyi, 2003; Fisk, 2002; Gordon, 2015; L. Gordon, 1994; Hills, 2013; Robinson et al., 2003; Watson, 2013). Some of these are reports from postgraduate study and suffer from the budget and time constraints that are prevalent in that context. Some are parts of other larger works (Robinson et al., 2003) and were not an area of focus. In any case, there is an absence of hard science with large sample size and independent voice.

Much of the research has the stamp of government authority and/or funding) (Hodgen, 2005; Langley, 2009; Wylie, 2007, 2016; Wylie & King, 2005; C. Wylie, 1997, 2009; C. Wylie, King, J., 2004, 2005). The New Zealand Council for Educational Research (NZCER) and other bodies such as Cognition Education are regularly approached by Government or NZSTA to answer particular questions about schooling in New Zealand. NZCER's core work is in the area of student outcomes, but Wylie in particular has written about Tomorrow's Schools for about 25 years. Research performed by NZCER has two biases to deal with: the authority of the funding body and the obligation that respondents may feel to participate in the research.

There is no demographic information about board members available. This is surprising and disappointing. This calls into question the role of the New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZSTA). The association receives government funding for trustee professional development. Workshops and webinars run throughout the year. But they were not interested in supporting this report and they do not publish any information about the demographic makeup of their members.

They do not appear to be independent of the ministry and seem to be overly supportive of ministry efforts (New Zealand School Trustees Association, 2017).

A focussed comparison of governance standards to decile is missing from Robinson et al. (2003).

Conclusion

Effective governance has been defined as **collaborative decision making.** This is exemplified by a board where all decisions are able to be considered without a great deal of expertise. The board has a flat structure, where all members have the same level of authority. The separation between governance and management is not only well defined but regularly discussed and measured.

NPM has pulled schooling into a competitive, market-driven environment. Agents in this environment do not act in collaboration: they are enemies and adversaries. The power structures that Tomorrow's Schools established have not been examined in depth. These structures are the role and the experience of the principal, the experience of the chair, the term of the board members, the level of interest in the elections, the capacity of board members in terms of skills and qualifications.

Chapter 3: Method

The literature review has highlighted specific gaps in the research related to the power balance within school boards of trustees in New Zealand. In particular, a broad based, independent survey of board members is needed in order to better understand the condition of BOTs.

Sample size

There are 2482 schools in New Zealand that fall under the requirements of the Ministry of Education to have a board of trustees. Because of my professional role as an advisor to schools in the North Island, research was limited to South Island schools. Of the 623 state and state integrated schools in the South Island of New Zealand, 588 have an email address listed on the internet (*Schools Directory*, 2017). Within this sample, there are fewer than 588 principals. Schools under limited statutory management or other intervention may not have a principal. Most schools have a staff trustee. Secondary schools have a student trustee. Each school has about 5 elected members. Proprietors of state integrated schools appoint members to each board in varying levels of authority. Boards often co-opt non-elected members for their skills or cultural perspective.

Table 1 Sample Size

| Description	Count	Percentage population
Number of schools in New Zealand	2542	
Less North Island schools and schools not required to have a board (independent and teen parent units)	623	
Schools with listed email addresses	588	
Estimated number of other board members	2940	
Negative-response rate	9	2%
Survey responses from principals	32	5%
Survey responses from other board members	167	6%
Total number of board members (NZSTA figure)		1%

Potential board roles are:

- Principal

- Elected trustees

- Proprietor's trustees (at state integrated schools)

- Student trustees (at secondary schools)

- Co-opted members

- Ministry appointed members

Ideally, boards should reflect the ethnic mix of their community, so a mix similar to that displayed in Figure 1 is expected. Decile rating is distributed evenly across New Zealand, but the South Island has far fewer low decile schools (Figure 2). There are only 8 decile 1 schools in the South Island.

Figure 1 South Island Ethnic Mix

Figure 2 Decile Distribution in the South Island

According to Bevir (2012), in a high decile school an empowered board and a more accountable principal is expected. In a low decile school, a less qualified board and a principal with less accountability is expected. If this correlation is positive, it can be inferred that there is a positive relationship between principal accountability and higher decile schools. Decile causes a change in board capacity.

The Survey

Questions were asked related to the respondent, the context, governance, and a question about tomorrow's schools. Demographic information about board members included their age, gender, occupation, qualifications, and their role on the board. Each of these factors have some implication for the power balance in a group setting. The decile and the experience of the principal were also collected. Decile is the key measurement of this paper, as it is referred to in the hypothesis. Questions about governance included ratings and room for comments about the agenda, minutes, number of questions asked, and level of discussion at board meetings. Finally, a question about Tomorrow's Schools was asked. This was intended to gauge the level of faith that the respondent has in the system.

A web survey was designed using Google Forms and tested for mobile phone compatibility. The survey was able to be accessed from a hyperlink within an email, a hyperlink within a PDF, a shortened URL, or a Quick Response code (QR code). The full survey is detailed in Appendix B on page 41.

A personalised email was sent to the boards of the schools that have listed their email address on educationcounts.govt.nz (Appendix C). The email addressed to boards of trustees is in Appendix C on page 44. The messages were sent in batches of 100 between 19 February and 1 March 2018. These messages would have been read by a school employee, passed to the principal, and (ideally) forwarded to the board. The constraint of this method means that there were two key gatekeepers, the school employee and the principal. Six schools replied to the email stating a range of reasons. Opportunity for respondents to discuss their answers further lead to some snowballing. The survey was shared on a social networking website.

Assumptions

Bevir's work (2012) points towards some governance structures favouring the wealthy. The market environment advantages higher socio-economic groups. They use their skills to improve the facilities in their community through entrepreneurialism.

Chapter 4: Research Results

In this chapter the results from each of the questions of the survey and the comments from the respondents are presented. There is a brief explanation for each of the charts and tables below, and the overall trends are discussed in Chapter 5. The data shows some striking trends in the area of gender, ethnicity, and age. These trends have implications on how board work might play out. The data related to agenda, discussion, and the opinion of Tomorrow's Schools has also indicated that the power balance is different in the lower decile boards.

Demographic data

A total of 199 responses were collected. Among the categories of external appointments, staff trustees, and student trustees, 38 principals responded (only 32 completed the survey) and 120 elected members. Figure 3 shows the percentage of South Island schools in each decile, and the percentage of responses from each decile. It is important to note that 2% of South Island schools are decile 1 and 15% are decile 10. This is because decile is calculated nationally. This demonstrates the concentration of a higher socio-economic population in the South Island. The responses from decile 1 have been omitted from some the charts. There were 5 responses from decile 1 trustees (from 8 decile 1 schools in the South Island). 4 of the responses were ministry appointed so they have been coded as outliers.

Table 2 lists the 6 schools that formally declined to participate in the survey in writing.

Table 2 Negative responses

Reason for declining	Decile
Board is ineffective / busy[3]	8
Commissioner (under statutory management)	9
No reason	8
State of change	8
State of change	8
State of change	10

[3] The principal wrote that the school "struggles to find a bot, the principal does most of the work…" This answer is discussed on page 24.

Figure 3 Responses from Each Decile

Figure 3 Responses from Each Decile

Gender

Figure 4 shows that there are more women in lower decile boards, and they are younger – increasing the power difference within the board. The Ministry for Women (2016) asserts that while steady progress has been made to eliminate discrimination against women, there is much work to be done. If women face the same the prejudices in a board that they do in the rest of their life, such as unconscious bias (Ministry for Women, 2017), lower decile board memberships do not have the same voice as high decile board memberships.

Figure 4 Gender Balance

Figure 4 Gender Balance

Age

Table 3 shows that elected trustees are generally a decade younger than principals. A possible explanation could be that they should be current parents of school aged children. The average age of a male principal is 50. The average age of a female principal is 56. Male and female elected trustees are 46 and 34 respectively.

Table 3 Average age of Principals and Elected Trustees (weighted average method)

	Female Principal	Male Principal	Female Trustee	Male Trustee
n =	17	14	68	51
Average age	**56.76**	**50.71**	**34.26**	**46.47**

The two figures on page 20 graphically represent the age difference between male and female principals (Figure 5), and male and female elected trustees (

Figure 6). If age and gender are a factor in BOT power balance, then these figures illustrate that there is a generational difference between an average female principal and an average female trustee.

Figure 5 Principals by Gender and Age

Figure 6 Elected members by Gender and Age

Ethnicity

Figure 7 shows that ethnicity of respondents is strikingly European and not at all representative of the South Island population. 3% of respondents identify as Māori compared to a South Island total of 13%[4]. The government's Constitution Report (2013) compares representation at national and local government levels and identifies deficits in particular communities despite legislative mechanisms in place to ensure that Tangata Whenua representation is maintained. This has not been identified in the literature as an issue in BOTs.

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[4] Figures from StatsNZ

Figure 7 Respondents by Ethnicity

Figure 8 shows the spread of trustee ethnicities across each decile. Tangata Whenua are particularly underrepresented in lower deciles. This is surprising, as they continue to feature in statistics for unemployment and lower standards of living (Marriott, 2014).

Figure 8 Ethnicity by Decile

Figure 9 Tangata Whenua Roles

Figure 9 is a deeper examination on the roles of Tangata Whenua within each decile. It shows that out of the 18 Māori who responded, 11 were elected by the community, 3 were co-opted, 2 are principals, there is 1 proprietor's representative, and 1 ministry appointment. It is evident that the issue of under representation of Tangata Whenua in governance roles is the same as it is in many other areas (Constitution Advisory Panel, 2013). Co-opting members is an effective method for improved representation. Figure 9 also shows that co-opting and ministry appointment is more common in the lower deciles, indicating a desire to improve representation in those boards.

The lack of representation of minorities shows a fundamental flaw in the laisse faire / market driven structure of Tomorrow's Schools. The New Public Management reforms were driven by white males and white males have thrived in them. The small-scale democracy of a BOT election, particularly one in a low decile area where governance skills are scarce provides an opportunity for dominant community leaders to become more dominant.

Roles of Board Members

The initial intention of the Picot Report was that board members were made up of parents, but 14 elected trustees reported that they have held the position for more than 10 years. This is a trend that has emerged: the president of the NZSTA has been a trustee since for 29 years (Kerr, 2015). As the experience and service of incumbent candidates is highly valued, this creates inertia. As demonstrated by a respondent comment, long serving principals can contribute to this inertia.

> *The Principal predates tomorrows schools and reminds us of that fact. He goes*
> *through the motions but does what he wants anyway and has little respect for*
> *the board. There is a significant issue with the power and control a principal holds*

from my experience in the primary sector (and an old boys network to keep it like
that) with this school compared to another school I now have a child at which
operates much more like I am used to in the tertiary sector, which is how I believe
it should be.[5]

Representation is in tension with qualification (/capacity). A well-qualified member of the community may benefit the school with their business skills and entrepreneurial thinking, but possibly be at odds with the needs of the community. The Constitutional Advisory Panel's recommendations are to use the same structures in local government as are used in national government – Maori seats and electorates (Constitution Advisory Panel, 2013). It is this paper's contention that representation on a micro level (BOTs) is just as important as it is on macro level (national government).

Figure 10 Membership Role of Board Members


Figure 10 shows that the membership role of board members are well represented in each decile by the respondents. Decile 1 is dominated by ministry appointed trustees and this is why it has been omitted from analysis. Co-opted members are more common in lower deciles. Co-opted members are usually evidence of a lack of specialist skills or ethnic representation.

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[5] Decile 10

Effective governance

The following section seeks to analyse what actually happens during board meetings. As collaborative decision making (Bevir, 2012) has been identified as the definition of effective governance, the ease of participation for trustees is the focus.

Three key questions were asked:

1. Who sets the agenda in board meetings? The agenda directs and excludes what a board discusses and decides upon.
2. How comfortable are trustees to add agenda items? Collaborative decision making requires that trustees are comfortable to add agenda items.
3. How many questions are asked? This question is designed to estimate the level and depth of discussion.

Who sets the agenda?

The three figures below (Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13) need to be carefully compared. Combined, they show that the chairperson has a greater influence in lower decile boards. The three figures also show that only 64% of respondents in deciles 2-5 report that the agenda is written by a process of collaborative decision making (Bevir, 2012). Deciles 6-7 report 73% and deciles 8-10 report 75%. Good governance practice (collaborative decision making) is more evident in higher deciles, confirming Bevir's assertion that "many forms of collaborative governance strongly favour the wealthy, the more educated, and those who belong to dominant racial and ethnic groups"(2012).

Deciles 2 to 5

- A combination
- The chairperson
- The principal

8%
28%
64%

Deciles 6 to 7

- A combination
- not sure
- principal and chair
- The Board and senior management
- The Board secretary in consultation with the chairperson
- The chairperson
- The principal

9%
12%
2% 2%
2%
73%

Deciles 8 to 10

- A combination
- The chairperson
- The principal

9%
15%
76%

The following quotes demonstrate that there is a sense that some trustees are not able to contribute to the agenda in the way that they would like to. Respondents describe a very close relationship between the principal and the chair. It seems that the chair has elevated status. The chair is elected by the board, but there is plenty of opportunity for meddling in this process. It is very concerning that agenda items are filtered through the chair before being added to the agenda. All members should be equally able to raise agenda items and ask questions.

> *Our chair doesn't set an annual work plan, which would be valuable to the Board. This would also allow the management to work on tasks during the year, rather than rushing.*[6]

> *These are screened by the chair and if not relevant to governance then removed.*[7]

> *Never have had the chance, though, as we are having to prioritise and we've not been taught that we could contribute.*[8]

> *Very closed minded board between principal and staff.*[9]

> *I would like to more than I currently am. The chair and principal are close and make most decisions.*[10]

However, there are some quotes to the contrary. The below quote comes from a male trustee on a Decile 2 board.

> *We have a strongly led and collaborative board where anyone on the board can request an item be added to the agenda.*[11]

How comfortable are trustees adding agenda items?

The following quotes demonstrate that there is a sense that some trustees are not able to contribute to the agenda in the way that they would like to. Respondents describe a very close relationship between the principal and the chair. It seems that the chair has elevated status. The chair is elected

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[6] Decile 6.
[7] Decile 3
[8] Decile 1
[9] Decile 4
[10] Decile 5
[11] Decile 2

by the board, but there is plenty of opportunity for meddling in this process. It is very concerning that agenda items are filtered through the chair before being added to the agenda. All members should be equally able to raise agenda items and ask questions.

> *These [agenda items] are screened by the chair and if not relevant to governance then removed. [12]*

The above comment is particularly concerning. A more transparent approach would be to list the items that have been removed from the agenda in the minutes and note the reasons why they were regarded as "not relevant to governance." The scenario described asks too much of the chair in terms of accountability.

> *Yes-though I have tried to share knowledge and new directions with the chair to add to the agenda which haven't been added to meetings unfortunately[13]*

How many questions are asked in each board meeting?

Figure 14 addresses the content and amount of discussion within each board meeting. It shows that fewer questions are asked in lower decile boards. 43% of decile 2-5 trustees report fewer than 10 questions per meeting compared to 21% of decile 8-10 trustees. A more empowered board can be expected to ask more questions than a disempowered, intimidated board.

Figure 14 How Many Questions Are Asked?

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
[12] Decile 3
[13] Decile 5

One respondent remarked that that chair often prematurely ends discussion on controversial topics. Further comments from this respondent indicate that a strong membership hierarchy is in place within this board. The idea of a membership hierarchy is one where certain members of the board have more authority than others. This is discussed further on page 35. This respondent asked for their comments to not be quoted in the final report. [14]

A comment from a principal is interesting:

> *Easy for any board member to contribute an agenda item. In practice, this doesn't happen very often.[15]*

This poses an issue around the level of engagement that trustees have with the board. Members need to feel free and unencumbered to contribute agenda items. If there are barriers to collaborative decision making in individual boards, then a viable escalation process needs to be established for disenfranchised / throttled board members. If it is the case that disenfranchised trustees are more widespread then the integrity of the system as a whole is called into question.

Figure 15 Trustees who do not feel comfortable contributing agenda items

Figure 15 is a deeper examination of respondents that do not feel comfortable contributing agenda items. The ability and confidence to contribute agenda items is an essential part of good governance practice if defined as collaborative decision making. It shows that trustees in lower decile schools are more far less likely to be comfortable contributing agenda items. Minorities are over-represented in

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[14] Decile 8
[15] Decile 7

this statistic, with women and non-Europeans dominating the group. Again, a type of membership hierarchy has emerged.

Figure 16 shows that trustees in lower deciles contribute less to discussion.

The vibe is very defensive from the principal if she's gets questioned[16]

Figure 16 How would you describe the amount of discussion you personally contribute?

Have the objectives of Tomorrow's Schools been met?

Trustees were asked if the objectives of Tomorrow's Schools were met, defined as 'communities making decisions about the future of children.' The results show that socially advantaged respondents are more likely to feel that the objectives to Tomorrow's Schools have been met. This conclusion is important because it answers the question in the title of this paper: "Who's in charge…" The privileged are in charge of their schools. The underprivileged are not. Figure 17 proves the validity of Bevir's argument that "governance structures favour the wealthy…"(Bevir, 2012).

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[16] Decile 4

Figure 17 Do you think the objectives of Tomorrow's Schools have been met?

The direct question about Tomorrow's Schools stimulated some respondents to make some important comments. One principal supported Bevir's assertion that some governance structures favour the privileged convincingly.

> *Schools are politically driven. We are at the mercy of political and often economic decisions rather than proven pedagogy. Board trustees have no idea what they're getting into as volunteers and many cannot/do not give the time that is needed. Some decision making is totally out of their field of knowledge and it requires time and effort to research. No school has autonomy.* ***Schools like us who have a rich resource of professional people both on the board and as active change makers in the School community, are advantaged.***[17] (emphasis added)

The unanticipated

A principal at a very remote decile 8 school reported that her community has 9 families to form a board from. Parents are busy and uninterested in board membership. She described a "roster system.". She felt that everything was left up to her and that tomorrow's schools had a negative effect on her school.

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[17] Principal, decile 4.

Chapter 5: Discussion – Analysis of Findings

Chapter 4 presented the results of the survey with explanation and some comment. In this chapter, the findings from Chapter 4 are briefly discussed in response to the research question and consideration is given to the hypothesis. Negative response bias is discussed, as is gender, ethnicity, age, the New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZSTA), small schools, and a membership hierarchy.

The Research Question: Who's in charge? After twenty-nine years of tomorrow's schools, are decisions really being made by the community?

Representation and good governance practice is evident in higher decile school boards. Lower decile school boards and boards of small schools do not show signs of good representation or good governance practice.

The Hypothesis: School decile causes a change in capacity for decision making. It isn't possible that capacity for decision making could cause a change in school decile.

The data shows that there are age, gender, and ethnicity differences between high and low decile schools. Higher decile school trustees are whiter, more male, more qualified, and more ethnically representative. Decision making in these boards is more collaborative and less dominated by the chair. Trustees are more comfortable adding agenda items and contributing to discussion. They are more likely to believe that the objectives of Tomorrow's Schools have been met.

Lower decile school trustees are 3 times more likely to be female than trustees in higher decile schools (page 20). While co-option is a tool at lower decile boards' disposal, Tangata Whenua representation remains very low. Lower decile boards are more likely to be dominated by the chair (page 27). Trustees ask fewer questions and contribute less. Lower decile school trustees are twice as likely to believe that the objectives of Tomorrow's Schools have not been met as those in higher decile schools.

Negative Response Bias

The six schools that declined the invitation to participate in the research reveal a key aspect to their management procedures . This may suggest that employees are filtering messages that they believe the board to be not interested in. A message addressed to the board would ideally be considered by the board and the response needs to be on behalf of the board. It is likely that advertisers address marketing material to boards and it is not suggested that boards reply to each of these. This paper

asserts that any response to a message addressed to a board be responded to on behalf of the board – not on behalf of the school.

The New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZTSA) was requested to invite their members to participate. They declined "…due to the high number of surveys sent to boards…." (see Appendix D). Contact was established with the admin of the NZ School Trustees Facebook group. This group is in no way affiliated with the NZSTA. The survey was published in that group and an increase in responses was noted. Unfortunately these responses cannot be differentiated from those that were distributed to schools as emails to schools were ongoing.

Gender

Volunteer work is often left to women (Ministry for Women, 2016). Men with lower socioeconomic status may work hours that make BOT involvement difficult. Board involvement in high decile schools may be regarded as a high status position and may attract well-qualified men who want to be visible within their community. The board capacity dimension is in effect here: successful schools have high capacity boards. Members in high decile boards are likely to have strong networks, business/management experience, and professional skills.

Ethnicity

Tangata Whenua representation is built into the legal structures at a national level. It is an area of concern at a regional level (Constitution Advisory Panel, 2013) and this research shows that the same problem exists at a community level.

Age as a factor in governance

Given the nature of families, the ages of parents, and the career trajectories of principals, the age gap between principals and parent trustees is to be expected. The age gap between the principal and the elected trustees raises some questions about the power balance within a board. An average-aged female principal is 22 years older than an average-aged female trustee. It's surprising that this has not been investigated by researchers or addressed by the board training material.

All board members are only given access to the information that the principal chooses to give them. average female trustee

As for the difference between male and female principals, it is no secret that men advance in their careers faster than women.

The role of the New Zealand School Trustees Association

The New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZSTA) is partly funded by the Ministry of Education. Concern has been expressed by the Secondary Principal's Council about the association's bias (New Zealand Secondary Principals' Council, 2016). The NZSTA has received about $8M annually since 2014 (Casey, 2017).

While the NZSTA acts as an advisor to everyone involved in each school, they do not act as an ombudsman or regulator for boards. The Education Review Office (ERO), is a branch of the Ministry of Education that are only concerned with teaching and learning. Not finance or governance. The ministry only steps in when a board is obviously completely ineffective.

Small schools and small communities

The average size of a school in New Zealand is 180 students. A high decile school will also have a larger population of parents to select trustees from as the families are likely to have fewer children and there is elevated status granted to an individual who gains membership on such a board. A low decile school is likely to have a lower number of parents as the families are likely to have more children.

Small schools experience this effect to an extreme degree. There are 109 schools in the South Island with 50 students or fewer. BOTs are not suitable for small schools in small communities. This is the biggest flaw in the model. A board of directors is appropriate for a medium size business, but not a sole trader.

A membership hierarchy

The definition of good governance that has been used in this paper is collaborative decision making. A board with good governance is one where all members are confident to add agenda items, ask questions, and have equal voice. There is evidence that a membership hierarchy is in place in many boards in this research. To borrow from Orwell, there is a structure where some board members are "more equal than others…."

The process of board election requires candidates to be nominated (they can nominate themselves) and voted on to the board by the parent community. There is only an election if more there are more than 5 candidates. Once elected, it is common for boards to co-opt members if the elected trustees lack certain skills (often accounting/legal) or the board is not ethnically representative.

Tomorrow's Schools set the principal up as a gatekeeper to knowledge. They have the ability to filter most of the reports that might appear before the board. It is up to the conscience (or skill) of the

principal to keep the board informed. This is the same as in the corporate world, where a CEO can hide information from the board of directors.

The chair also acts as a filtering agent. Legally, they have more power than the principal. The board can dismiss the principal, but the principal cannot get rid of the board so easily. The data on agenda setting on page 27 suggests that in a lower decile school, the chair has more influence than in a higher decile school. This supports the model of the membership hierarchy.

Staff trustees are in a very awkward situation, attending meetings where matters are discussed that their colleagues on the teaching staff are not aware of. Their manager, the principal, is attendance. This will have an impact on what they say and do in meetings. The board as an entity is their employer. NZSTA training materials are at pains to emphasise that the staff trustee is "not a delegate for the staff." (NZSTA, 2018) This is response to the common belief that the staff trustee is the staff representative.

> *Our board is very open however being the staff representative it can be difficult to ask some questions.*[18]

Elected members, co-opted members, student trustees, proprietors appointees, and ministry appointees go into the mix and fill out the board composition.

Conclusion

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[18] Decile 5

Chapter 6: Conclusions

The purpose of this research has been to investigate whether there is a link between decile and effective governance within boards of trustees in New Zealand. The findings show that such a link does exist and that the more privileged communities are well suited to the competitive New Public Management structures of Tomorrow's Schools. The key areas of concern are:

1. Low participation in boards of trustees in lower socio economic populations – this includes a lack of engagement and the domination of the chair
2. The membership hierarchy
3. Representation – of ethnicities
4. Poor governance practice, and an absence of ownership of this issue
5. Rural communities with small schools

Research Overview

The electronic survey gathered data from trustees across the South Island and sought to answer the question: "Who's in charge? After twenty-nine years of tomorrow's schools, are decisions really being made by the community?" A hypothesis was developed in order to answer this: "School decile causes a change in capacity for decision making. It isn't possible that capacity for decision making could cause a change in school decile." This hypothesis has been proven.

Future work

A broader project that involves more lower decile schools, particularly in the North Island, would be beneficial. This work should include deeper analysis of representation of ethnic minorities.

Work that investigates the membership hierarchy that was uncovered would also be valuable. In particular: "are long serving chairs of boards of trustees more effective than short term chairs?"

Conclusions

The "attempts to slow down or reverse government growth…" and "the shift towards privatisation…" forecast by Hood (1991) are observable in the governance of education in New Zealand. The market structures that New Public Management ideology has forced upon education has benefited the privileged as Bevir (2012) asserts.

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Appendix

A. Relevant sections of the Education Act, 1989

In the absence of prescriptive content of finance in the Act, the Ministry collated a set of National Administration Guidelines (NAGs). NAG 4 ("The National Administration Guidelines," 2013) reads:

> *According to legislation on financial and property matters, each board of trustees is also required in particular to:*
>
> - *allocate funds to reflect the school's priorities as stated in the charter;*
> - *monitor and control school expenditure, and ensure that annual accounts are prepared and audited as required by the Public Finance Act 1989 and the Education Act 1989; and*
> - *comply with the negotiated conditions of any current asset management agreement, and implement a maintenance programme to ensure that the school's buildings and facilities provide a safe, healthy learning environment for students.[19]*

Boards of trustees are required to submit a charter to the Ministry of Education, and to create a budget in line with their charter ("The National Administration Guidelines," 2013).

Schools are classed as "State Services 2" Government Agencies, and therefore "expected" to comply with the Government's procurement polices (*Government Rules of Sourcing*, 2015, p. 10). 'Expectation' is differentiated from:

- "Required" – for the public service and some state services
- "Encouraged" – for the state sector and public sector

During the last 29 years, the New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZSTA) has grown into a large organisation that provides training and advice to boards and principals, funded in part by the ministry. In reality, it is the only source of training for board members.

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[19] https://education.govt.nz/ministry-of-education/legislation/nags/#NAG4

B. The survey presented to trustees

Board of Trustees Survey

This survey has been designed to establish the power balance within boards of trustees in New Zealand schools.

In 1989, following the Tomorrows Schools report, the power balance within schools was supposed to change. Whereas before 1989 the majority of power within a school was held by the principal the reforms were designed to radically change the situation.

The Tomorrow's Schools reforms were designed to give the power within each school to a democratically elected board of trustees who would represent the local community. This short questionnaire seeks to examine whether or not this change has occurred.

This survey will take 15 minutes to complete. Completion and return of the questionnaire implies consent. Should you decide to participate, at any time you can:

- Decline to answer any particular question.
- Request further information.
- Ask any questions about the study at any time during participation.
- Provide information on the understanding that you will remain anonymous.
- Request access to the final report when it is concluded.

This project has been evaluated by peer review and judged to be low risk. The researchers named below are responsible for the ethical conduct of this research. The subject matter of this survey is related to an academic research project and is in no way deemed to relate to the opinions of any other person or entity.

If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research that you wish to raise with someone other than the researcher, please contact Dr Brian Finch, Director, Research Ethics, telephone (06) 356 9099 x 86015, email humanethics@massey.ac.nz or you may contact my supervisor, Dr Andy Asquith, A.Asquith@massey.ac.nz.

Please contact the researcher should you have any questions or concerns.

Kind regards

Steve Voisey

Massey Business School School Executive MBA Student

(email address)

*What is the decile of the school that you are on the board of? ***

(enter number)

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Other:

What is your ethnicity?

- European
- Māori
- Pacific Peoples
- Asian
- Middle Eastern/Latin American/African
- Other Ethnicity

What is your position on the board? *[20]

- Elected member
- Co-opted member
- Staff trustee
- Student trustee
- Principal
- I prefer not to answer
- Other:

What is your household income? *

- <35k
- 35 – 50k
- 50-75k
- 75-100k
- 100-150k
- >150k
- I prefer not to answer

How would you describe your occupation? *

- Managers
- Professionals
- Technicians and Trades Workers
- Community and Personal Service Workers
- Clerical and Administrative Workers
- Sales Workers
- Machinery Operators and Drivers
- Labourers
- I prefer not to answer

What is your age?

- <19
- 20-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60-69
- >70

How many years of board experience do you have?

(enter number)

What is your highest educational qualification? *

- Secondary
- Tertiary
- Graduate
- Post graduate
- I prefer not to answer
- Other:

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[20] Caveat denotes a required question

*How many years of experience does the principal have? **

(as a principal)
(enter number)

*Who sets the agenda for the year? **

- The principal
- The chairperson
- A combination
- I prefer not to answer
- Other:

Are you able to contribute agenda items?

- Yes
- No
- I'm not sure

Please feel free to comment on the previous question regarding agenda contributions if you wish.

Do you feel comfortable contributing agenda items?

- Yes
- No
- I'm not sure

Please feel free to comment on the previous question if you wish.

*Generally, what do the minutes of each meeting represent? **

- A consensus agreement of the points discussed at the meeting
- A reflection of the minute secretary's understanding of what happened at the meeting
- A reflection of the principal's understanding of what happened at the meeting
- A reflection of the board chair's understanding of what happened at the meeting
- I prefer not to answer

Please feel free to comment on the previous question if you wish.

*How many questions are asked by board members during each board meeting? **

- 0
- <2
- <5
- <10
- 10+
- I prefer not to answer
- Other:

Please feel free to comment on the previous question if you wish.

*How would you describe the amount of discussion you personally contribute? **

- I hardly ever say anything in board meetings
- I speak occasionally at board meetings
- I frequently speak at board meetings
- I have something to say for every item on the agenda
- I prefer not to answer
- Other:

Please feel free to comment on the previous question if you wish.

Do you think the objectives of Tomorrow's Schools have been met?

The objective was to have communities making decisions about the future of children.
- Yes
- No

Please feel free to comment on the previous question if you wish.

Would you like to have a confidential discussion about your responses?

You will remain anonymous.
- Yes
- No

If yes, please provide contact details.

C. Letter addressed to boards of trustees

Hi Robin

I am writing to request your board's participation in a research project I am conducting in support of my Masters of Business Administration at Massey University. The purpose of the research is to establish the power balance within boards of trustees in New Zealand schools.

There is a 15 minute survey for each board member to complete (including the staff trustee, student trustees, and the principal). Trustees can click on this link to complete the survey: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfc2EtC6uAUPEjdAN-erJBDoV52C5ccSFrFyLG1KjzNNgnyNA/viewform

Should your board decide to participate, at any time they can:

Decline to answer any particular question.

Request further information.

Ask any questions about the study at any time during participation.

Provide information on the understanding that you will remain anonymous.

Request access to the final report when it is concluded.

Kind regards

Steve Voisey

Massey Executive MBA Research Project

Steve Voisey
214 Moore Street
Howick 2014
Auckland
steve.voisey.mba@voisey.co.nz

02/19/2018
To the chair of the Board of Trustees at Hornby High School

Dear Sir / Madam

I am writing to request your board's participation in a research project I am conducting in support of my Masters of Business Administration at Massey University. The purpose of the research is to establish the power balance within boards of trustees in New Zealand schools.

There is a 15 minute survey for each board member to complete (including the staff trustee, student trustees, and the principal). There are three ways to access the online survey.

1. Click on this link.
2. Using a computer or smart phone, type this into the internet browser: tinyurl.com/nzbot
3. Using this QR code

Should your board decide to participate, at any time they can:

- Decline to answer any particular question.
- Request further information.
- Ask any questions about the study at any time during participation.
- Provide information on the understanding that you will remain anonymous.
- Request access to the final report when it is concluded.

Kind regards
Steve Voisey

D. Communications with New Zealand School Trustees Association

Hi there

I am writing to request the NZSTA's endorsement of a research project I am conducting in support of my Masters of Business Administration at Massey University. The purpose of the research is to establish the power balance within boards of trustees in New Zealand schools.
There is a 15 minute survey for each board member to complete (including the staff trustee, student trustees, and the principal). To view the survey, please click on this link.
I am targeting schools in the South Island, as I conduct business with schools in the North Island.
I would appreciate it if you could distribute the link to any messages you send to South Island board chairs in the next two weeks. Give me a call on xxxxxxxxx to discuss.
Kind regards,
Steve Voisey

Hi Steve

Thanks for your enquiry regarding your MBA survey.

Unfortunately due to the high number of surveys sent to boards we are not able to distribute your survey. We wish all the best for your research.

Kind regards,
(name removed)
A Manager
National Office
New Zealand School Trustees Association

E. Data

Table 4: Responses by role on the board

Role	Count
Appointed	4
Proprietor's appointee in an integrated school	5
Student trustee	5
Co-opted member	8
Staff trustee	16
Principal	31
Elected member	103
	172

Table 5 Average ages of principals and elected trustees

Category midpoint	Female Principal	Male Principal	Female Trustee	Male Trustee
25			25	
35		70	595	105

45	90	270	1935	1440
55	550	110	330	605
65	325	260	65	325
Average age	56.76	50.71	34.26	46.47